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The Enduring Local Harm
from Recessions
Brad J. Hershbein and Bryan A. Stuart
ARTICLE HIGHLIGHTS
n We study the impacts of
each recession over the past 50
years on the economic health
of metro areas.
n Areas that suffer larger
employment losses during a
recession never fully recover
their employment relative to
less-affected areas.
n Badly hit areas also have
less population growth, and
the share of the population
that is employed, as well as per
capita income, are lower for
at least a decade.
n These areas also grow
relatively older and often
become less educated, with
fewer management and
professional jobs.
n Recessions play a role
in some areas falling
economically behind others,
as employment opportunities
shift across areas more quickly
than people do.
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Recessions receive enormous attention from
researchers, policymakers, and the public.
Most of this attention focuses on short-run,
nationwide measures like the unemployment
rate and gross domestic product. Tese outcomes
are clearly important, but many of the broader
and longer-lasting consequences of recessions
remain uncertain. Tis is particularly true for
how recessions afect local labor markets, such as
metropolitan areas.
In particular, do badly afected areas eventually
recover to be on par with their less-afected peers,
or is the economic harm sufered during recessions
persistent, possibly putting severely hit areas on a
permanently lower trajectory for employment and
earnings? To answer this question, we examine the
long-term impacts of fve national recessions—
from the one in the mid-1970s through the Great
Recession—on employment, population, earnings,
and other outcomes for 363 metropolitan areas
in the United States. Because the severity of each
recession varied across these areas—some had
heavy losses in employment while others actually
gained jobs—we essentially compare worse-hit
places to less-afected places, tracking outcomes for
several years afer each recession’s end.
We fnd that, for every recession, harder-hit
metropolitan areas sufer long-lasting economic
harm relative to less-afected areas. Teir paths
diverge, and the former group falls behind in
terms of employment, population, employment
rates, and per capita earnings. Specifcally, an
area that loses 5 percent of its employment
during a recession—the typical loss during the
Great Recession—on average has 6.2 percent less
employment than it otherwise would have almost
a decade later. Population also falls, mostly because
of fewer people moving in rather than more people
moving out, but this loss is not as large as that for
employment. Consequently, the share of the adult
population that is employed falls by 2 percentage

points, or 1 out of every 50 people. Tis decline in
the employment rate also leads to a long-term 3.2
percent drop in per capita earnings.
Moreover, these persistent economic impacts
are ofen accompanied by modest, but not trivial,
changes in the demographic characteristics of
afected places. Te share of residents aged 65 and
over increases, while the share aged 15 through 39

We fnd that, for every recession,
harder-hit metropolitan areas sufer
long-lasting economic harm relative
to less-afected areas.
falls. Fewer workers are employed in managerial,
professional, and technical occupations, and more
are employed in manual and service jobs. Te
share of residents with a college degree falls. Even
adjusting for these demographic changes, however,
the majority of the employment and earnings
impacts remain.
Our fndings have important implications for
the reallocation of economic activity across places,
labor market dynamism, economic opportunities
for workers and their children, and optimal policy
responses. While our social safety net is mostly set
up to respond to current (or very recent) economic
conditions, our fnding that recessions have
enduring impacts on places long afer the national
economy has recovered suggests that targeting
aid based on a longer economic history may be
necessary to preserve economic opportunity for all.

How Recessions Can Have Long-Lasting
Local Efects…
Recessions are periods of depressed economic
activity, and they coincide with large cuts to
employment as the demand for labor falls. Tese
declines generally vary across places because of
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diferences in industry specialization or
in the types of workers afected, as well
as the nature of the recession.
If during a recession most frms
temporarily lay of workers or reduce
their hours, then employment, wages,
and the share of people employed are

Areas that lost 5 percent more
of their employment during a
recession have employment rates
1–2 percentage points lower,
even up to a decade later.
likely to quickly revert to previous
trends once conditions improve. If,
on the other hand, a recession causes
employers to change their production
processes or shut down, there could
be long-term scarring in a local labor
market. Tis could also happen if highly
skilled (and higher-earning) workers

are more likely to leave for other areas
not as badly afected, or if the recession
diverts would-be in-migrants—both
people and businesses—to other areas.
Recent research has found support
for all these possibilities, but has not
systematically examined the longterm outcomes of places badly hit by
recessions.

…and Vary across Places
We thus look at places as defned
by metropolitan areas. Tese 363 areas
are groups of counties tied together
by commuting patterns and having an
urban center of at least 50,000 people.
Although they exclude rural areas,
they account for between 66 and 83
percent of the country’s people and
jobs between 1969 and 2016. Tese
metropolitan areas proxy for local labor
markets, the places in which people
work and look for jobs. (Our results are
similar when we examine commuting
zones, which include rural areas.)

Figure 1 The Severity of the Great Recession Varied Considerably across Metropolitan Areas

Te severity of recessions varies
considerably across metropolitan areas.
Figure 1 shows this variation for the
last recession we analyze, the Great
Recession of 2007–2009. We measure
the local severity of the recession by
the change in employment between the
national peak and the national trough—
in this case between 2007 and 2009—in
each metropolitan area. On the map,
areas with darker red shading sufered
greater proportional employment
losses. Although some entire states were
badly afected—Michigan, notably, as
well as the Sun Belt states of Florida and
Arizona—there are also several cases
where neighboring areas fared quite
diferently, such as Providence and
Boston, or Pittsburgh and Youngstown.
Our analysis essentially compares
the long-term outcomes of places that
were more severely afected to those
that were less afected, and we do this
separately for each of the past fve
recessions: the ones in 1973–1975,
1980–1982, 1990–1991, 2001, and
2007–2009. Of course, the metropolitan
areas that sufered severe employment
losses may have difered in several
ways from those with smaller losses,
and it is important to control for these
diferences. Terefore, we are also
careful to account for diferences in
prerecession population growth (by
age group), and we implicitly compare
metropolitan areas within each of nine
regions in the country. Moreover, our
analytical approach, called an event
study, allows us to confrm that moreand less-afected areas were trending
similarly before the recession; this helps
ensure that the less-afected areas serve
as a good comparison to what would
have happened in the more-afected
areas had the recession there not been
as severe.

Local Recessions Don’t Just Fade Away

NOTE: Figure shows the change in the natural log of employment (approximately equal to the percent change in
employment) between 2007 and 2009 for 363 metropolitan areas (Core-Based Statistical Areas, as defned in 2003 by
the Ofce of Management and Budget). Areas in darker colors experienced larger employment losses.
SOURCE: Authors’ analysis of Bureau of Economic Analysis Regional data.
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When we implement this approach,
we fnd that employment doesn’t just
fall more immediately in harder-hit
areas (this happens by construction),
but it remains depressed for at least a
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decade, and ofen longer. Specifcally,
we estimate that for every additional
1 percent drop in employment during
a recession, employment is between
0.8 and 1.7 percent lower than it
otherwise would have been seven to
nine years afer the recession ended.
For a Great Recession–sized shock,
when a 5 percent employment loss was
not unusual, this means a long-term
reduction in employment of roughly
4–8 percent. To be clear, we don’t mean
that employment is necessarily lower
than it was before the recession began,
but that it is lower than it would have
been in the absence of the recession.
Put diferently, growth is on a lower
trajectory.
We also fnd this same pattern of
persistently lower growth in an area’s
population. Every 1 percent greater
employment loss during a recession
translates to between 0.3 and 0.7
percent lower population nearly a
decade later. One might think this is
driven by people moving out of badly
afected areas, but we fnd the opposite.
Fewer people move away; rather, the
population loss occurs because fewer
people subsequently move into hard-hit
areas, and this efect lasts a long time.
Moreover, the composition of the
population shifs, with the population
of badly hit areas aging and ofentimes
having fewer highly educated
professional workers than less-afected
areas.
Put together, the long-term impacts
on employment are greater than
those on population, and thus the
employment rate—the share of people
with jobs—also sufers long-term
declines in areas that experienced more
severe recessions. We illustrate this
pattern in Figure 2, which shows these
declines for each recession. For each
panel, the two vertical lines indicate the
beginning and end of the recession (in
terms of employment). Tat the thick
blue line is near 0 before the recession
indicates that areas have similar trends
in the employment rate, regardless of
how large their employment losses
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Figure 2 In Every Recession, Harder-Hit Areas Sufer Persistent Declines in
Employment Rates
B: 1980-1982 recession

A: 1973-1975 recession
0.25

0.25
0.00

0.00

-0.25

-0.25

-0.50

-0.50

-0.75

-0.75

-1.00

-1.00

-1.25

-1.25
1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985

1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991

D: 2001 recession

C: 1990-1991 recession
0.25

0.25
0.00

0.00

-0.25

-0.25

-0.50

-0.50

-0.75

-0.75

-1.00

-1.00

-1.25

1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001

-1.25

1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012

E: 2007-2009 recession
0.25
0.00
-0.25
-0.50
-0.75
-1.00
-1.25

2003

2005

2007

2009

2011

2013

2015

NOTE: Figure shows, separately for each recession, the impact of a 1 percent greater employment loss during a
recession (between the vertical lines) on the employment rate over time. Complete recovery is reached when the
solid blue line returns to 0. Dashed lines indicate 95 percent confdence intervals.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations using Bureau of Economic Analysis Regional data (employment) and Surveillance,
Epidemiology, and End Results data (population).

will be. In each case, as expected, the
employment rate falls sharply during
the recession. Tis decline persists,
however, once the recession is over:
for the 1973–1975, 1990–1991, and
2001 recessions, there appears to
be no recovery at all, while there is
only incomplete recovery for the
1980–1982 and 2007–2009 recessions.
Consequently, areas that lost 5 percent
more of their employment during a
recession have employment rates 1–2
percentage points lower, even up to a
decade later. For a typical metropolitan

area of 150,000 workers, that’s 1,500 to
3,000 fewer people with jobs.

Policy Implications
Te long-term impacts of local
recessions also afect income, and
we estimate that in badly hit areas,
long-term per capita earnings are
between 1 and 5 percent lower than
they would have been in the absence
of the recession. Tese losses are
disproportionately borne by residents
in the bottom half of the earnings
distribution.
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What explains these long-term
impacts? We are actively working on
this question, but at a fundamental
level, employment opportunities shif
across areas more quickly than people
do.
Altogether, our research indicates
that recessions produce enduring
economic disruptions to local
economies, and this pattern has
existed for at least the past fve

Recessions produce enduring
economic disruptions to
local economies, and this
pattern has existed for at least
the past fve decades.
decades. Consequently, recessions
likely play a role in the shif of
economic activity across places over
time; this, in turn, has implications
for economic opportunity for people
who grow up in areas badly hit—
especially repeatedly—by recessions.
Te social safety net meant to deal
with cyclical, temporary labor
market disruption—unemployment
insurance, SNAP (food stamps), and
one-time cash grants—has not, in
the past, led areas to recover. Instead,
public policy may need to come up
with more extensive and longer-term
programs to help workers improve
their skills, help businesses retool,
and, more broadly, help communities
reinvest in economic development.
Financial support for this project was provided by the
U.S. Department of Labor Scholars Program.

Workforce Data
(and Knowledge)
under Pressure
Joshua D. Hawley
In the frst half of 2020, more
than 40 million people fled an initial
unemployment insurance claim, and
according to the U.S. Department of
Labor, over 33 million people were
collecting benefts—both all-time
highs (see Figure 1). As a result of
COVID-19 and its efect on the
economy, nearly every county in the
United States experienced record
unemployment growth in April, with
little improvement since.

Strengthening Workforce Data
Is Critical
To address such rampant
unemployment, policymakers
require more powerful and more
robust employment data systems
than currently exist. In my role as a
professor and researcher at the Ohio
State University, I worked with state
agencies and academic colleagues
to build a longitudinal data system
linking information from education,
workforce development, and social
services. Te linked data have
allowed researchers in government

and academia to study the impact of
individual outcomes for public policies,
such as employment or education. Te
book Data Science in the Public Interest:
Improving Government Performance in
the Workforce, recently published by
the Upjohn Institute (see p. 7 for more
details), describes how state-specifc
data systems like the one in Ohio can
help us improve the capacity to address
challenges such as the rapid increases
in unemployment (Hawley 2020).
I recommend four specifc steps:
1) Increase the use of administrative
records in employment statistics.
2) Better fund workforce data system
infrastructure.
3) Explore partnerships with private
organizations that have signifcant
data on the labor force.
4) Build on the partnerships between
universities and states to make use
of these data, especially to focus
attention on inequalities in the
labor market.

ARTICLE HIGHLIGHTS
n The COVID-19 pandemic is an unprecedented challenge for federal and state data
systems needed to design policy responses.
n States cannot improve their systems on their own but need federal investment and
collaboration with outside partners.

Brad J. Hershbein is a senior economist at the
Upjohn Institute, and Bryan A. Stuart is an
assistant professor of economics at George
Washington University.

4

n Cloud computing and tiered access to data offer efficiency advantages, but both
the federal and many state systems need technology modernization for the shift to
happen.
n Partnerships with universities are critical to ensuring that data systems are used
to their full potential to solve social problems, including racial inequality in labor
markets.
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The Coleridge Initiative
States ofen need to share
workforce data to solve pressing
economic and social problems—
like an economic recession
or natural disaster such as
COVID-19—while preserving
privacy and state autonomy
over their own records. Te
Coleridge Initiative is a nonproft
organization that maintains
state administrative data with
cutting-edge, cloud-based security
protocols (the FedRamp standard),
granting access to specifc,
approved projects. Te initiative
also ofers training courses to state
and university analysts, providing
a context to use the data in the
public interest. (Te author is a
collaborator on the Coleridge
Initiative.)

Invest in Administrative Data Capacity
State workforce data systems are
aging. Many states still run their
unemployment insurance systems
on old sofware and computer
equipment—some that are 40 years
old. A well-publicized efort in
April aimed to recruit programmers
familiar with old computer languages
systems, such as COBOL. A decade
ago, the National Association of State
Workforce Agencies identifed the
long-term neglect of computer systems
as a key barrier to resiliency, reporting
that states simply could not handle the
demands of claims during the Great
Recession (let alone the current one).

Te problems have grown as the federal
government has reduced funding for
helping states maintain their systems.

Figure 1 U.S. Unemployment Insurance Claims, 2007–2020
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Millions

Each month, the Bureau of Labor
Statistics releases employment
statistics based on two surveys, the
household-based Current Population
Survey (CPS) and the business-based
Current Employment Survey (CES).
Tere are signifcant strengths to
these two surveys. Tey ask detailed
questions allowing granular analysis,
and (between the two) their scope
is broad, covering nearly all types of
employment. However, the sample
sizes are still limited, with the CPS
surveying some 60,000 of the more than
120 million households in the country,
and the CES capturing 145,000 frms
relative to the more than 10 million
business establishments. Moreover,
these surveys sufer from nonresponse.
In a good month, some 15 percent of
sampled households refuse to complete
the CPS survey. During the COVID-19
crisis, the overall CPS nonresponse
rate has grown to over one-third, with
similar if smaller increases for the CES.
Since we do not know whether this
nonresponse is random, it is difcult to
understand whether the information
collected is completely representative of
the entire U.S. labor market.
Fortunately, administrative
data—data collected for the
administration of certain government
programs—can fll some of these
gaps. State unemployment insurance
wage record systems, for instance,
collect employment and wage
information from employers for all
workers covered by unemployment
insurance, as authorized in the Federal
Unemployment Tax Act of 1937.
Trough agreements with the states,
the Census Bureau uses these data
for statistical purposes, producing
trends in employment, earnings, and
job transitions down to the county
level, and for diferent industries
and demographic groups of workers.
Although not all workers are included
(the self-employed are a large excluded
group), the greater scope allows far

more detailed, if less timely, statistics
than those allowed by surveys.
Additionally, several individual states
increasingly use their unemployment
insurance systems for research and
evaluation of their own labor markets,
sometimes in conjunction with other
states. One such efort is through the
Coleridge Initiative (see sidebar).

Millions

Increase Use of Administrative Records
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Tese issues could be rectifed with
additional funding and stafng support
from both state and federal sources,
as there is already agreement on best
practices. Additionally, greater support
could also expand the usefulness of

Nearly every county in the
United States experienced record
unemployment growth in April,
with little improvement since.
the data, such as providing linkages to
employees of the federal government
(not currently covered by state
unemployment systems) or providing
additional worker detail, such as
demographics and occupation and job
title.

Private Sector Data
Employers, schools, and workforce
providers ofen store their data
with a wide range of private sector
vendors. For example, payroll frms,
such as ADP, maintain records on
employment, pay, and benefts for
a wide range of organizations, and
ofen include information not in
unemployment insurance records,
such as occupation and rate of pay.

Many states still run their
unemployment insurance systems
on old software and
computer equipment—some
that are 40 years old.
Credit bureaus, such as Equifax,
track individual credit information
and loan repayment history based on
business fnancial transactions. Because
companies submit these data as they
are processed, records are more up to
date than resources from the federal or
state governments. Payroll and credit
frms have typically sold access to these

6

data to employers and other businesses,
but they are increasingly being used
by researchers on an anonymized
basis, such as the Opportunity
Insights economic recovery tracker.
Furthermore, although use of private
data still faces legal hurdles, there
are new examples from California of
statewide eforts to use anonymized
credit data for public policy.

Partnerships to Improve Capacity and
Focus on Inequities
Te most pressing needs to
improve data systems are not technical
resources—rather, human resources
are needed to create an efective
governance structure for assembling,
sharing, and analyzing the data (Lane
2020). Limits in existing human
capital—ofen due to limited budgets—
mean that simple automated reporting
takes the place of sophisticated
analyses. Diagnosing the current crisis
in unemployment, and understanding
why, for example, African Americans
and women face greater challenges,
requires new operation models. One
such new model is through greater
partnership with state universities.
Ohio, for instance, has partnered with
the Ohio State University to expand
its research and analysis capacity
(Hawley 2020), and California has
similar eforts underway through the
California Policy Lab at the University
of California Berkeley and Los Angeles
campuses. Te collaboration with
state government has led to greater
use of data for dashboards, such as the
Workforce Success Measures and the
Workforce Data Tools. Te investments
in data science have given us the ability
during the COVID-19 pandemic
to pivot quickly to dashboards on
unemployment and food security.
Tese partnerships are increasingly
regional—the Midwest states, for
example, collaborate on data analysis.

Conclusion
Te current unemployment crisis
drives home the weaknesses in state
workforce systems. State administrative
data are increasingly important to
workforce policy decision-making
and help compensate for limitations
in existing survey-based data. Most
states sit on a wealth of valuable data
that unfortunately are siloed, and
they have few resources with which to
analyze the data to promote sound and
efective public policy. With relatively
small increases in funding, however,
substantial improvements in the quality
and timeliness of workforce data are
possible, including supplementing
administrative data with data collected
by the private sector. Additionally,
partnerships, such as the one between
the Ohio State University and state
and local governments, help leverage
existing resources more cost-efectively,
and provide examples for how other
states can better understand labor
market changes during crises and
policies to address them.
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New Book from the Upjohn Press
Data Science in the Public Interest

Improving Government Performance in the Workforce
Joshua D. Hawley
Governments accumulate
a lot of data on residents,
especially those who
participate in some
form of social insurance
program. But what do
they use these data for?
Do they use the data in a
manner that is efcient
and helps the most
people? And are there
better ways to use the data? These are the key questions
addressed in this new book from the Upjohn Press.

Hawley begins by describing governments’ various
workforce programs and how public policy afects
the data development systems. He then provides an
overview of how governments currently use data to help
in decision making and federal and state performance
management systems. He ofers specifc examples
of technical structures used to provide data to state
performance management systems in the workforce
area, focusing on those of Ohio and Washington. A
discussion of the legal and governance issues that arise
when a state establishes a data system follows.
Hawley also discusses technical developments
that states have made in performance management

systems for workforce development and explains
three examples: scorecards, dashboards, and data
visualizations.
Overall, Hawley brings to light new ways government
is using tools to inform decisions about the workforce
at the state and local levels. He moves beyond
standardized performance metrics designed to meet
federal agency requirements and discusses how
governments use tools that can provide up-to-date
information for decision makers.
Read the introductory chapter.
$25 pbk. ISBN 978-088099-674-7 150 pp. 2020.
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